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In this dissertation I argue that English has a third type of if, that is, a declarative subordinator 
that introduces irrealis content clauses. I present evidence that strongly suggests that irrealis 
if-clauses function like VP-internal complements or subjects, and not like adjuncts. In 
syntactic tests like extraction, preposing, clefting, and constituent order, irrealis clauses 
behave predominantly like complements. Moreover, no other preposition with conditional or 
concessive meaning can be used to replace irrealis if, which strongly suggest that irrealis 
clauses should not be considered conditional protases. A close analysis of the semantics of 
irrealis clauses also points towards a non-conditional analysis. Irrealis clauses refer to 
hypothetical states of affairs, but no idea of condition is implied in their meaning. Irrealis 
clauses usually have to be extraposed, but some predicates like prefer, imagine and hate allow 
irrealis clauses without extraposition. This further supports my proposal that irrealis if should 
be considered a subordinator. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that when and how are also 
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This dissertation proposes that the class of declarative subordinators in English should be 
extended to include a new item that, following Pullum (1987), I will call irrealis if. Examples 
of irrealis if can be seen in (1), where, if present, the proform it should not be interpreted as 
referentially linked to an external antecedent, whether in the wider discourse or pragmatically 
retrievable (exophoric reading): 
 
(1)  
 a. It would be wonderful if degrees didn’t cost the earth.  
 c. I would be glad if you could enlighten me with some advice.  
 d. I would prefer if the DSB had its own library.  
 e. Pibe hates it if people say that servi vicarii were replacement slaves.    
 e. Can you imagine if people really believed that? 
 
At first sight, the if-clauses in (1) seem to be ordinary adjuncts, but I will show that, 
semantically and especially syntactically, conditional adjuncts and clauses introduced by 
irrealis if are substantially different. Semantically, irrealis if-clause are related to conditional 
adjuncts in that they both denote hypothetical states of affairs, but irrealis clauses do not have 
a condition as part of their meaning, as we can see if we replace the if’s above with other 
conditional prepositions or expressions such as provided that or as long as (again, exophoric 
readings should be excluded): 
 
(2) 
 a. *It would be wonderful provided that degrees didn’t cost the earth.  
 c. ?I would be glad as long as you could enlighten me with some advice.  
 d. *I would prefer provided that the DSB had its own library.  
e. *Pibe hates it as long aspeople say that servi vicarii were replacement slaves.    
 e. *Can you imagine provided that people really believed that? 
 
The main differences between conditional if and irrealis if are, however, syntactic. 
Conditional if is a preposition that heads prepositional phrases functioning as adjuncts. 
Conversely, irrealis if is a subordinator that introduces declarative content clauses that 
function as complements inside the VP, as we can see if we apply some of the tests for 
complementhood. (3) shows that irrealis clauses allow extraction (a), can be foregrounded in 
pseudo-clefts (b), and cannot be preposed and followed by an intonational break (c): 
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 (3) 
 a. This book, which would be wonderful if many people read.  
 b. What I would hate is if I had to go to the hospital for this.  
 c. *If nobody believed in God, I would prefer. 
 
This dissertation is structured as follows: in Chapter 1, I review the literature on irrealis if. 
Few authors have studied the phenomena I deal with in this dissertation. Of these, only 
Pullum (1987) considers irrealis if as a subordinator. Williams (1974), Steriade (1981) and 
Pesetsky (1991) do not analyse irrealis if as different from conditional if, but suggest instead 
that interpretative rules allow for irrealis clauses to be interpreted as the logical argument of 
the matrix predicate. I will show that their accounts introduce rules and assumptions that are 
not warranted in other parts of the grammar, and that more parsimonious accounts should be 
preferred. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the reasons for positing a third if. In section 2.1 I will 
argue that irrealis clauses are semantically different from conditional adjuncts. In section 
2.2.1, I will present a series of syntactic arguments for considering irrealis clauses as internal 
complements and therefore irrealis if as a subordinator. In section 2.2.2, I will deal with the 
question of the status of the proform it that often co-occurs with irrealis clauses. I will argue, 
based on Postal and Pullum’s (1988) description of expletives, that this it is a non-referential, 
semantically empty dummy that optionally takes the place of irrealis clauses when they are 
extraposed. In section 2.2.3, I will briefly suggest that when and how should also be 
considered members of the class of subordinators. Finally, in chapter 3 I will discuss a 
possible candidate for the label of irrealis if, that is, the if that follows predicates like doubt. I 
will argue that this if should not be considered an irrealis if, but simply one of the 
interrogative subordinators. I will conclude by highlighting the wider implications of irrealis 
if, and by presenting future research questions raised by the enlargement of the subordinator 
class.  
 
Before I proceed with the rest of the dissertation, however, I should clarify the terminology I 
will use throughout, and why I assume that English already has two if’s.  
 
 
How many if’s? Prepositions and subordinators in The Cambridge Grammar. 
 
As the title of this thesis suggests, my analysis rests on the assumption that there exist two 
types of if’s. Traditional grammars treat if as a subordinating conjunction, regardless of 
whether it introduces a conditional or an interrogative clause. My analysis is based instead on 
Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002) (The Cambridge Grammar from now on) revised 
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categorisation of prepositions and subordinators, which recognises two if’s: a preposition and 
an interrogative subordinator. This distinction is fundamental for the account of irrealis if 
presented here, and I will therefore dedicate this section to outlying the arguments in favour 
of it.  
 
I will start by presenting the traditional account of if, as presented by Quirk et al. (1985) and I 
will then compare it with that of The Cambridge Grammar. The two grammars are by no 
means original or alone in their respective analyses. The Cambridge Grammar’s revision of 
the preposition class was first argued by Jespersen (1924: 89) and is also found in Emonds 
(1985: Ch. 6 albeit with some differences) and McCawley (1998: 195-6) among others. As 
the two major reference grammars for English, however, they will be my main sources for the 
discussion in this section.  
 
Quirk et al. (1985: 997-8, 1008, 1054) do not distinguish between two classes of if. Their 
analysis recognises only one type of if, that is, a subordinating conjunction that introduces 
subordinate clauses. Thus, the distinction between ‘conditional’ and ‘interrogative’ resides 
not in the introducing item, but on the type and function of the clause that it precedes. 
Conditional if introduces adverbial clauses functioning as adjuncts, whereas interrogative if 
governs nominal clauses that can function as subject, direct object or complement of a noun 
or an adjective. Labels like ‘nominal’ and ‘adverbial’, however, are misleading. The analogy 
with the behaviour of nouns and adverbs does not maintain (pace Leech 2004: 132), as not all 
nominal clauses can be replaced by a noun (or NP) (4a-b), or vice versa (4c-d): 
 
(4)  
a. the question whether they are guilty or not.  
b. the question *guilt/their guilt. 
c. We left before the storm.  
d. *We left before that the storm had ended.1  
 
Moreover, the labels are superfluous, as they are not assigned based on the form of the 
clauses, but on their function within larger units (e.g. subject, complement). However, Quirk 
et al have to spell out these functions separately, as they are not predictable from the label 
itself. As no relationship between the form of a clause and its function is ever given, equally 
no explanation is given for the different distribution of conditional and interrogative clauses. 
This is unsatisfactory given the fact that, in their analysis, the two ifs belong to the same class. 
                                                
1 For Quirk et al. (1985) the whole item ‘that the storm had ended’ is a nominal clause.  
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Quirk et al. also fail to explain that conditional and interrogative clauses can differ in form as 
well as distribution. The examples in (5) are all from their grammar, and are described as 
“abbreviated clauses” (1985: 1086) that is, clauses with an ellipsis of the subject and the finite 
form of be. The fact that interrogative if cannot be followed by abbreviated clauses (6) is, 
however, not addressed:  
 
(5) 
  a. If in doubt, see me.  
 b. If known, such facts have been reported.  
 c. If possible, you should test all moving parts.  
 d. If coming by car, take the A10 and turn off at the A414.  
 
(6)  
 a. *I wonder if in a hurry. 
 b. *They asked if known.  
 c. *I wonder if possible.  
 d. *I don’t know if coming by car.  
 
The differences in function, distribution, and form between clauses introduced by conditional 
and interrogative if are accounted for if the two if’s are treated as belonging to two different 
classes.  
 
The Cambridge Grammar (598-600, 1011-1014) revises the traditional categories of 
preposition, conjunction and adverb entirely. Whilst traditional grammars distinguish between 
the three classes depending on the type of dependents that they can take, The Cambridge 
Grammar takes the view that a distinction on this basis is untenable. Just like nouns and verbs 
can take a range of different complements (NP, content clause, etc. or no complement at all) 
without this warranting a change of category, prepositions should remain prepositions 
regardless of the type of complement that they take. Items are instead categorised on the basis 
of their distribution and syntactic function. Thus, in (7) the items in italics are all considered 
prepositions by The Cambridge Grammar irrespective of the fact that they each take a 




 a. They are both very keen [on golf ]. (NP) 
 b. The magician emerged [from behind the curtain]. (PP) 
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 c. I didn’t know about it [until recently]. (AdvP) 
 d. They took me [for dead]. (AdjP) 
 e. We can’t agree [on whether we should call in the police]. (Int. clause) 
 
(The Cambridge Grammar, 599, adapted from ex. 3) 
 
This new classification would seem to leave no residual need for a category of subordinators. 
But the crucial difference between prepositions and subordinators is that the former are heads 
of phrases functioning (predominantly) as adjuncts, whereas the latter are meaningless, non-
head markers of subordination that introduce clauses functioning (predominantly) as 
complements. Thus, The Cambridge Grammar departs from Quirk et al. not only in the 
labelling of items, but also in the syntactic and structural analysis of the items introduced by 
prepositions and subordinators. Consider the underlined items in (8): 
 
(8)  
 a. We only started crying [after the end of the film.]  
 b. We only started crying [after the film ended.] 
 c. We thought {that [the film was emotionally manipulative]}. 
 
Quirk et al. (1985: Ch. 15) refer to items in square brackets in (8b) and (8c) as subordinate 
clauses. The only difference they recognise is in their function (adjunct and direct object 
respectively). The bracketed content in (8a) is described as a PP functioning as adverbial 
adjunct. The Cambridge Grammar, on the contrary, treats the bracketed items in (8a) and (8b) 
as prepositional phrases, functioning both as adjuncts, and differing only in that the 
dependents inside them are an NP and a content clause respectively. The item in curly 
brackets in (8c) is analysed as a subordinate clause with a clause as head (in square brackets) 
and subordinator that as a dependent marking the subordinate nature of the clause that follows 
it. Whilst in (8b-c) the preposition after has lexical content and describes the (temporal) 
relationship between we started crying and after the film ended, marker that does not 
establish a relationship between the subordinate and the main clause. In (8c) the relationship 
is between the main verb (thought) and the content clause: that merely functions as a marker 
that the clause that follows it is not an independent clause (and this is why that can often be 
omitted). 
 
It should be clear now why The Cambridge Grammar recognises two types of if. Conditional 
if is a preposition with lexical content heading phrases that function as adjuncts. Interrogative 
if is a subordinator that introduces subordinate interrogative content clauses functioning as 
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complements. This dual classification allows one to account for all the differences in form, 
function and distribution that the traditional analysis either failed to explain or simply 
ignored. Below, I will list all these differences in detail. 
 
a) Interrogative if only introduces finite clauses. Conditional if can take a range of dependents 
(see (5) and (6) above).  
 
b) As adjuncts, items headed by conditional if can be preposed. Internal complements cannot 
(Emonds 1985: 249; Chomsky 1965: 101): 
 
(9)  
 a. We will go to the park if it’s sunny.  
 b. If it’s sunny, we will go to the park.  
 
(10)  
 a. We were wondering if we should stay a bit longer.  
 b. *If we should stay a bit longer we wondered. 
 
c) In relation to wh-extraction, conditional if phrases are strong islands, interrogative if-
clauses are not (cf. Chomsky 1986, Cinque 1990, Huang 1982).  
 
(11)  
 a. We would have called you if we had known about your illness.  
 b. *What would we have called you if we had known about t? 
 
(12)  
 a. They asked us if we knew about her illness.  
 b. What did they ask us if we knew about t? 
 
d) As adjuncts, conditional if phrases cannot function as predicative complements of 
specifying be. Interrogative if-clauses can2.  
 
                                                
2 The Cambridge Grammar (p. 974) states that interrogative clauses introduced by if (as opposed to 
whether) are not allowed in this function. My informants, however, find examples like (14b) 
acceptable, if stylistically marked. Various similar examples can also be found in the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA). 
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(13)  
 a. We will only go if it’s sunny.  
 b. *The only condition is if it’s sunny.  
(14)  
 a. They asked us if the manuscript was real.  
 b. The real question is if the manuscript is real.  
 
e) Conditional if cannot be replaced by whether. Interrogative if can be replaced not only by 
whether, but also, occasionally, by that: 
 
(15) 
 a. We will go to the party if they invite us.  
 b. *We will go to the party whether they invite us.  
 
(16)  
 a. I was wondering if/whether we should go to the party.  










Irrealis if has attracted little in depth attention in the literature. Lakoff (1968: 69f) Noonan 
(1985: 104-5) and MacCawley (1988:149) all briefly mention that if can be found in the role 
of declarative subordinator, but do not devote much attention to the issue, nor its wider 
implications for the grammar. Only four authors, Williams (1974), Steriade (1981), Pullum 
(1987) and Pesetsky (1991), have studied irrealis if in detail, reaching rather different 
conclusions. In this section, I will review their contributions. At this stage, I will point out the 
problems with previous accounts, but I will refrain from offering my alternative analysis, 
which I will develop instead in the following chapter. Since many of my arguments are based 
on and expand Pullum’s account, I will not discuss his work at this stage, but I will refer to it 
in Ch. 2 when I will present my full-fledged proposal.  
 
Before I procede, I should establish the terminology that I will be using throughout this 
section. The authors that I will review approach the subject from different theoretical 
frameworks and using different labels for the same phenomena. For example, none of the 
authors use the term subordinator, preferring complementizer instead. Similarly, adjuncts are 
often referred to as adverbial clauses and internal complements as objects of the VP. For the 
sake of clarity and consistence I will use my own terminology throughout, based on The 
Cambridge Grammar, and as discussed in the introduction above.3 Most importantly, the 
authors discussed here reject the notion of the existence of irrealis if  and of irrealis clauses, 
and do not use these labels, referring to them only as conditional adjuncts. The issue of the 
exact status of these clauses is the question that this thesis attempts to answer, and so its full 
discussion is left to the next chapter. Suffice to say at this stage that I use the label irrealis 
clause to refer to clauses that appear to be conditional adjuncts but that are semantically an 
argument of the predicate in the matrix clause.  
 
                                                
3 For a discussion of the difference between NP objects and content clause complements see The 
Cambridge Grammar pp. 1017-22.   
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1.1. Williams (1974).  
 
The first author to notice irrealis clauses and to suggest that they be treated as something 
other than ordinary conditional adjuncts is Williams (1974). He notes that in cases like (1a), 
the if-clause cannot be considered as an ordinary conditional clause because glad cannot 
occur without a complement (1b): 
 
(1)  
 a. I would be glad if Bill were here.  
 b. *I would be glad.   
 
(Williams 1974: 157, ex 105) 
 
Of course, glad is one of many predicates, like know and agree, that can appear without an 
overt complement. In these cases, however, the complement has to be anaphorically linked to 
an item that has to be retrieved either pragmatically or from discourse (Null Complement 
Anaphora, cf. Hankamer and Sag 1976 and Grimshaw 1979). Thus, it is no more possible to 
initiate a conversation with ‘I’m glad’ than it is to initiate it with ‘I know’ (Williams 1974: 
158). Moreover, irrealis if-clauses are subject to licensing restrictions that cannot be applied 
to ordinary conditional adjuncts. We can see these restrictions in (2), where irrealis if-clauses 
are only allowed with predicates that license that-clauses (2a-d) and that are factive (2e-f): 
 
(2)  
a. *I would be dead that Bill were here.  
 b. *I would be dead if Bill were here. (no irrealis reading) 
c. It is shameful that John left  
d. It would shameful if John left.  
 e. It is unlikely that Bob left. (non-factive) 
 f. *It would be unlikely if Bob left. 
 
(Wiliams 1974:158-9, adapted from ex.107) 
 
This leads Williams to conclude that the if-clauses in (1) and (2) cannot be analyzed as 
ordinary adjuncts. Williams’ suggestion is not, however, that irrealis clauses be considered 
internal complements, as in some aspects –such as their failure to function as subjects (3a-b) 
and in their inability to allow will to occur in them (3c-d)– they do not seem to behave like 
internal complements at all: 
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(3) 
 a. *If John left would be a shame.  
 b. That John left would be a shame.  
 c. *I will be glad if there will be no more fighting.  
 d. I will be glad that there will be no more fighting. 
  
 (Williams 1974: 160, ex. 111-5) 
 
Williams proposes instead that irrealis if-clauses be considered as one of a series of adjuncts 
that behave as if they were closer to the VP than other adjuncts. Other members of this 
category are certain because-clauses that also appear to be somewhat complement fulfilling 
(4a). These clauses behave differently from other adjuncts in that they cannot follow an 
intonation break (4b) and allow reflexivization (4c-d): 
 
(4)  
a. John is concerned because the mail is late. 
b. *John is concerned, because the mail is late.4  
c. John is angry because there are pictures of himself in the post office.  
d. *John isn’t angry, because there are pictures of himself in the office.   
 
  (Williams 1973: 161, ex. 119-20) 
 
Williams ascribes the differences between irrealis if-clauses and complement fulfilling 
because clauses on one side and other adjuncts on the other to a difference in the position in 
which they are generated. The former are generated as daughters of S, whereas the latter are 
daughters of S’ (1973: 163). Thus, no special status or category shift is posited for irrealis if.  
 
As I will argue in Ch. 2, my analysis is not compromised by the at times deviant behaviour 
noticed by Williams, as I allow for irrealis if to have a certain degree of idiosyncrasies and to 
retain some of the features of conditional if (the inability to allow will being one of them).5 I 
will not deal with the status of adjuncts like the because-clauses discussed by Williams, as 
they are far beyond the reach of this dissertation. Suffice to say at this point that most of 
                                                
4 His judgment of (4b) is surprising to say the least: the native speakers I consulted did not find this 
ungrammatical in the least, and many examples of similar sentences can be found in the COCA or on 
the internet.  
5 This constraint on conditionals does not necessarily apply to all conditionals, though. Haegemann and 
Wekker (1984: 48) note that peripheral conditionals do allow will: If it will rain tomorrow we might as 
well cancel the match now. 
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Williams’ observations concern irrealis clauses which function as complements of adjectives 
rather than as extraposed subject clauses or as complements of verbs. As Pesetesky (1991: 77-
8) has noted, and for reasons that I shall explain in Ch. 2, the irrealis clauses found in these 
functions seem to defy categorization even more openly than other irrealis clauses. 
 
 
1.2. Steriade (1981)  
 
Another author who considers and then rejects an internal complement analysis is Steriade 
(1981). She entertains two possible analysis for irrealis clauses. In the first one, the syntactic 
and the semantic structure of irrealis clauses match perfectly, with irrealis if functioning as a 
subordinator like that or whether and the if-clause functioning as internal complement to the 
VP. In the second analysis, the one which she supports, the irrealis clause is an ordinary 
conditional adjunct6 that, under certain constraints, is subject to an interpretive rule that links 
it to the logical argument of the matrix predicate. She opts for the second analysis for two 
main reasons: on the one hand, she claims that irrealis if-clauses (like all conditional clauses) 
behave like adverbial and not content clauses. On the other, irrealis if-clauses are 
“indistinguishable from conditional if-clauses” (1981: 3). I will start by looking at her first 
claim.  
 
Steriade argues that the view that irrealis if replaces that and whether in certain contexts is ill-
conceived because if-clauses are never content clauses (1981:4). This is already problematic, 
because this statement appears to deny the existence of interrogative if-clauses (that is, 
clauses where if is replacing whether), which are a subtype of content clauses. Thus, even 
though she never explicitly says as much, her argument implies not only that irrealis if-
clauses are not complements, but also that neither are interrogative if-clauses. This seems a 
rather outlandish claim, and one that is not found elsewhere in the literature as far as I am 
aware. In (5) we can see the examples that she uses to show that if-clauses are not content 




 a. That he left is tragic.  
                                                
6 Steriade uses the traditional terminology of ‘adverbial clause’ for ‘conditional adjunct’ and ‘noun-
clause’ for ‘content clauses’. She does indeed acknowledge the analysis of conditional adjuncts as PPs 
(she attributes this to Jackendoff 1977). As she recognises, the PP analysis of conditional clauses does 
not have a great bearing on her argument.  
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 b. Whether he left is still an open question.  
 
(6) 
 a. *If he left would be tragic.  
 b. *If he left is still an open question.  
 
(Steriade 1981: 4, ex 8 and 10) 
 
I do not contest the ungrammaticality of (6), nor that irrealis if-clauses have slightly different 
distribution from that-clauses. But Steriade fails to acknowledge that (6a) and (6b) differ in a 
crucial way. (6a) is declarative, whereas (6b) is interrogative. If she is using the examples in 
(6) to show that if-clauses are not content clauses like whether-clauses, she should also 
explain why if and whether are often interchangeable, and why there is hardly any conditional 
meaning in interrogative if-clauses.  
 
Steriade also points out that that irrealis if-clauses cannot be the focus of pseudo clefts, 
whereas content clauses (interrogative or otherwise) can. Setting aside the confusion with 
interrogative clauses, her grammaticality judgment is questionable: 
 
(7)  
 a. What I regret is that he left.  
 b. What I wonder about is whether he left.  
 
(8)  
 a. *What I would regret is if he left.  
 b. *What I wonder about is if he left.  
 
 (Steriade 1981: 4, ex. 11-12) 
 
My informants do not find (8) ungrammatical, and numerous examples can be attested on the 
internet from reputable sources (e.g. what I would hate is if they keep income tax and add 
VAT on top).7 In fact, Pullum uses pseudo clefts with an irrealis if-clause in focus position as 
one of his examples (What I would really hate would be would be if I had to fill out a form, 
Pullum 1987: 266).  
 
                                                
7 http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/64515 [Accessed 30th July 2010]. 
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The confusion between irrealis and interrogative carries over to Steriade’s last examples in 
favour of her claim:  
 
(9)  
 a. The dispute whether John was guilty went on for weeks.  
 b. * The dispute if John was guilty went on for weeks.8  
 
(Steriade 1981: 5, ex. 13) 
 
Once again, Steriade seems to be arguing against considering if as an interrogative 
subordinator rather than as a declarative, irrealis one. The examples in (9) say nothing about 
irrealis if. Instead, they show that interrogative subordinators if and whether have different 
distributional patterns, something which most grammars agree on without neither questioning 
the status of if nor even contemplating the existence of irrealis if (cf. The Cambridge 
Grammar: 973-4, Quirk et al. 1985: 1054). As we shall see in Ch. 2, these examples show in 
fact that some distributional differences between that and irrealis if are not a sufficient reason 
(other things being equal) for excluding the existence of a declarative if subordinator, just like 
distributional differences between whether and if are not enough to exclude the existence of 
an interrogative if . 
 
The second reason why Steriade rejects the internal complement analysis is that irrealis if-




 a. If he left it would be tragic.9  
 b. *That he left it would be tragic.  
 c. * Whether he left it is an open question.  
 
(11) 
 a. If he leaves you will regret it. 
 b. *That he left you will regret it.  
(Steriade 1981: 5, ex. 14-15) 
                                                
8 My correspondents find interrogative if-clauses functioning as predicative complements acceptable, if 
stylistically marked. Furthermore, examples can be found of this function in the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA), in the written as well as the spoken sections.  
9 Interestingly, McCawley (1988:149) marks sentences like (10a) with a question mark, and notes that 
they do not prepose as easily as adjuncts.  
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The examples that Steriade uses are all irrealis if-clauses, and her grammaticality judgment 
are indisputable. Nevertheless, what seems to trigger the ungrammaticality is not so much the 
sentence initial position, but the fact that if-clauses seem to be able to co-occur with the 
pronoun it whilst other content clauses cannot. Steriade seems to hint at this when she notes 
that “if-complements appear in structures that superficially resemble Vacuous Extraposition, 
regardless of whether a that-clause may be well formed in the same environment” (1981: 5). 
She presents the following examples: 
 
(12) 
 a. I would reveal/disclose it if he left.  
 b. *I will reveal/disclose it that he left.  
 
(13)  
 a. Would you understand it if I stopped doing the dishes? 
 b. *Have you understood it that I stopped doing the dishes?10 
 
(Steriade 1981: 5, ex. 16-17)  
 
One of the main characteristics of irrealis clauses, and indeed one if not the main reasons for 
positing the existence of irrealis if, is that the if-clause is said to constitute, at least 
semantically, the argument of the predicate in the matrix clause. Steriade describes this as 
“internal reading”, that is, a reading “under which the object of [the predicate in the matrix 
clause] is the state of affairs referred to in the if-clause” (1981: 1). She rightly notes, however, 
that an external reading, that is, a reading in which the logical argument of the matrix 
predicate is a state of affairs previously mentioned or retrievable from context, is also always 
available. Teasing the two readings apart (internal and external, or, in my terminology, 
irrealis and conditional) is indeed often difficult, and the difference between the two often 
slim. Nonetheless, the two readings should be kept in mind at all times, as the question risks 
becoming muddled otherwise. This leads me to my problem with Steriade’s use of examples 
(12-13) above. The if-clauses in (12a) and (13a) seem indeed to have rather different syntactic 
behaviour from the that-clause in their b counterparts. These if-clauses, however, are 
probably not irrealis clauses at all, but ordinary conditional adjuncts. We can see this more 
clearly if we compare one of them with a similar sentence presented by Pullum, and if we turn 
it into a pseudo-cleft:  
 
                                                
10 This is understand with the meaning ‘sympathise”.  
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(14) 
 a. We made a record of iti [if the animal did anything anusual.]i 
 b. *What we made a record of is if the animal did anything unusual. 
 c. *What we would reveal/disclose is if he left.  
 
(Pullum 1987: 266, ex. 29) 
 
Pullum notes that the pseudo cleft does not work because it does not make sense, 
semantically, to reveal or make a note of a hypothetical fact. In (14) the it refers to the result 
of the state of affairs of the animal doing something unusual or him leaving.11 Moreover, this 
means that the acts of revealing and making a record are posterior to the acts referred to in the 
if-clauses. As we shall see in Ch. 2 §1, this time lapse is allowed in conditional interpretations 
but excluded by irrealis clauses.  
 
Having argued against an internal complement analysis, Steriade suggests instead that irrealis 
if-clauses be considered as a subset of conditional clauses which are subject to “an 
interpretative rule that links the adverbial clause to a propositional argument position of the 
main verb” (1981: 7). This subset is allowed only when an anaphoric element (it or so) is 
present, or with Null Complement Anaphora predicates (NCA) such as mind, care, etc. In 
other words, irrealis clauses are “only available if the sentence is, without them, complete: in 
particular, if all subcategorised positions are independently filled” (1981: 7). 
 
There are three main problems with the interpretative rule that Steriade suggests. The first is 
that she simply assumes, without much discussion, that the proform it that is often found with 
irrealis if-clauses is cataphoric. As Pullum (1987) argues and I will show in Ch. 2, this is at 
best uncertain.   
 
Secondly, as I will show in more detail in Ch.2, irrealis clauses may occur even without any 
(alleged) anaphoric element, as in the examples below (the asterisk before the brackets shows 
that the clause is not complete if they are removed): 
 
(15)  
                                                
11 The difference is explicit in Italian, where the irrealis clause cannot co-occur with the proform lo: 
i) *Loi preferiamo  [se   non vengono.]i  
      it   prefer.1PL      if   not   come.3PL 
       ‘We prefer if they don’t come’ 
ii) Loi riveleremo [se fugge]i.  
     it   reveal.1PL  if   flee.3SG 
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 a. Imagine *(if you were a big Hollywood star).  
 b. I prefer *(if people are nice to me).  
 c. I hate *(when people eat in the library).  
 
Examples like the ones in (15) are dismissed by Steriade as the ungrammatical predictions of 
an internal complement analysis, but their grammaticality is unquestionable. In Steriade’s 
defence, it should be said that these examples may have been of dubious grammaticality at the 
time of her writing. In fact, ten years later Pesetsky refers to similar examples as marginally 
acceptable, and as stylistically marked. This gradual change points towards a hypothesis that, 
diachronically, irrealis if-clauses are moving from conditional adjunct to extraposed internal 
complement to non-extraposed internal complement, a type of change that is attested in 
English and other languages (cf. Lehmann 1988, Hopper and Traugott 1993: Ch. 7, Givón 
2001: Ch. 12), and which is consistent with my account12. I will not attempt to discuss this 
hypothesis here, but it is a fascinating question worth pursuing in future research. 
 
Finally, I should note that Steriade’ discussion of NCA predicates is also based on false 
premises. Some of the NCAs that she uses as examples license interrogative complements, as 
we can see if we replace if with whether or another wh-word in her examples: 
 
(16)  
I wouldn’t mind/don’t care/wonder/can’t remember/haven’t found out if he came.  
 
(Steriade 1981: 8, ex. 21a) 
 
(17) 
 a. I wonder whether he came/what dress she wore. 
 b. I can’t remember whether he came/where he went to school.  
  c. I haven’t found out whether he came/how much money I owe him.  
 
It is not clear why Steriade chooses to ignore an interpretation of the predicates in (16) in 
which the if-clause is neither a conditional adjunct nor an irrealis clause, but simply an 
interrogative one. Once again, if one followed her analysis through, one would have to 
exclude that interrogative if exists at all. If we did this, the grammaticality of interrogative if-
clauses licensed by predicates that do not allow NCA would become inexplicable: 
                                                
12 López-Couso and Méndez-Naya (2001) have attempted to answer this question already, but their 
judgements of whether if-clauses are complements or adjuncts are not always consistent, and what 
seem to be interrogative rather than irrealis if-clauses are sometimes included in their analysis.   
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 (18)  
 a. We tried to determine whether/if bilingual children are more intelligent.  
 b. *We tried to determine.  
 
(18a) should be ungrammatical according to Steriade’s account, as there is no null anaphoric 
element filling the predicate’s argument position.  
 
The question becomes more complicated with predicates like mind and care. The problem 
with these predicates is that they can license both declarative and interrogative finite clauses, 
and even non-finite ones, as shown in (19): 
 
(19) 
 a. I don’t mind/don’t care if/whether you are late tonight. 
b.Jane didn’t seem to care/mind whether her children would destroy her house or 
not. 
c.Jane didn’t seem to care/mind that her children were destroying the house. 
 d. Jane didn’t seem to care/mind people making a mess of her house 
e. Do you mind doing the dishes?  
 
Since when if is used with these predicates it can always be replaced by whether, it is 
tempting to analyse the irrealis clauses in (19) as interrogative rather then irrealis. 
Replacement of if with whether, however, does not leave the meaning unchanged. When 
whether is used in (19a), it means that I am indifferent to the answer to the question “will you 
be late tonight?”, and so it will hold true whether you are late or nor. When if is used, (19a) 
means that I am indifferent to the possibility of you being late, and it does not necessarily 
hold true that I will be equally indifferent to you arriving on time. The if version is thus 
declarative, not interrogative. Either way, there is no reason for positing a null complement 
and an interpretative rule with if, but no null complement with other subordinators or 
complement types. In fact, this account would not be able to distinguish (19) from examples 
where the if-clauses is a conditional adjunct and the predicate really has a null complement as 
in (20) (the antecedent is provided by the previous sentence). Notice that in these cases 
whether is not allowed, as the complement position is full:  
 
(20) 
Usually I don’t like waitingi, but I won’t mind__i if/*whether you promise you’ll 
never be late again. 
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Steriade also claims that her analysis explains why that-clauses and if-clauses behave 
differently with regards to wh-movement: as adjuncts, if-clauses do not form a constituent 
with their main predicate, as her bracketing shows (22): 
 
(21)  
 a. Just how sorry that he left do you think you are? 
 b. *Just how sorry if he left do you think you are? 
 
(22) 
 a. You think you are [just how sorry [that he left.]] 
 b. You think you would [be [just how sorry]] [if he left.] 
 
Steriade (1981: 9, ex. 23-4) 
 
Steriade’s judgment and explanation of the difference between (22a) and (22b) is faultless, 
and her observation seems to challenge my hypothesis. I will return to this in Ch. 2, so suffice 
to say here that, as I mentioned in reference to Williams’s comments above, the behaviour of 
irrealis if-clauses functioning as complements of adjectives is highly irregular, but that this 
does not necessarily undermine the existence of irrealis if.  
 
Finally, Steriade notices that irrealis if-clauses appear to be restricted to factive predicates. 
This is taken as a confirmation of her hypthesis, as she considers it as a predictable 
consequence of the fact that in conditional constructions the antecedent has to be presupposed 
to interpret the consequent. Thus, examples when the interpretative rule is expected to apply 
but that are unacceptable nonetheless can be predicted on the basis that they are semantically 
or pragmatically odd, as “it is not conductive to progress to first presuppose P and then to 
comment on the truth, likelyhood, possibility of P” (1981: 10): 
 
(23)  
 a. # It would seem so if he left.  
 b. # It would be true if he left.  
 c. # It would be likely if he left.  
 d. # It would be possible if he left.  
 
(Steriade 1981: 10, ex. 25) 
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The effect in (23) is only explainable, in her view, if one considers irrealis if-clauses, and the 
sentences they are embedded in, as “semantic conditional sentences” (1981:10). This is not 
necessarily the case, however. In my analysis, irrealis clauses do maintain some of the 
semantic features of conditionals, particularly their hypothetical nature. The examples in (23) 
are semantically odd precisely because they attempt to comment on the truth or likelyhood of 
something that is inherently hypothetical13. Moreover, as I shall reveal in the next chapter, the 
semantic oddness of (23b) is the best reason why a strictly conditional analysis of irrealis 
clauses should be avoided.  
 
 
1.3. Pesetsky (1991) 
 
An interpretative rule is also invoked in Pestesky (1991). His If-Copying (IC) rule is almost 
identical to Steriade’s, as it “supplies a factive complement not explicitly present at other 
levels of representation” and it associates the interpretation in (24b) to sentences like (24a)14: 
 
(24)  
 a. John would like it if Mary knew French 
 b. John would like it that Mary knows French if Mary knew French.  
 
(Pesetsky 1991: 62, ex. 247) 
 
The fact that the IC rule replaces an NPI licenser –conditional if– with a non-licenser (that) is 
used to explain why, as noted by Pullum (1987), irrealis if-clauses do not license NPIs 
(Pesetsky 1991:63). As with Steriade’s rule, an important restriction on the IC is that it is only 
applied when the direct object of the matrix predicate is occupied by a proform that is 
compatible with clauses. Thus, the IC rule fails to apply in cases like (25a) for which (25b) is 
not a possible representation: 
 
                                                
13 It might be argued that (23b) and (23d) should not be semantically odd, as they simply state that 
something that is hypothetical is, indeed, possible or likely.  In fact, the tautology might be part of the 
reason why they seem odd. It should also be noted that they are equally odd with a that-clause: 
i) # It would be likely that they came.  
ii) # It would be possible that they came.  
14 This is how Pesetsky (1991: 62) phrases the IC rule:  
1. Take a clause k of the form [if IP] or [when IP] where k modifies a sentence Σ.  
2. Copy k as k’ substituting that for if, making appropriate changes in mood so as to replace irrealis 
with realis mood marking.  
3. Place k’ in an argument position of Σ. Leave k as an adjunct modifier. (It gets interpreted as a 
restricting term, with Σ the nuclear scope) 
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(25)  
 a. I would like her if Bill were to ask me about the painting. 
b. *I would like (it) that Bill asked me about the painting, if anyone were to ask 
me about the painting.  
 
(Pesetsky 1991: 64, ex. 250) 
 
As stated, however, the IC would also have to apply when the irrealis if-clause is postverbal. 
But in this position, NPIs are allowed, which should not be the case if the IC rule were being 
applied and were substituting if for that. Notice the contrast between (26a) and (26b) 
 
(26)  
 a. *I would like it if anyone could help me.  
 b. If anyone could help, I would like it.  
 
The only way the IC can be prevented from applying to contexts like (26b) is by admitting a 
difference in the nature of the profrom it in the two examples. Thus, Pesetsky suggests that 
the it in (26a) is not referentially linked to the if clause, whereas the one in (26b) is. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, in (26a) the proform it cannot be anaphorically linked to the if-
clause due to Backwards Anaphora Constraints (BAC, Bresnan 1971, Postal 1972), and so, 
Pesetsky argues, the IC rule has to intervene to link the irrealis clause to the logical argument 
of the matrix predicate (1991: 73).15 Conversely, in (26b) the IC rule need not apply because 
the if-clause is already referentially linked to the proform it and its argument position. 
 




 a. *I would love thati [if unicorns existed]i.  
 b. *We can enjoy thisi without shame [if unicorns exist]i.  
 c. *I would prefer thisi if Kim [were not informed]i. 
 
(Pesetsky 1991: 74, ex. 300) 
 
                                                
15 As we shall see, the BAC are not quite as clear and as uncontroversial as Pesetsky seems to assume.  
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He claims that these examples are not acceptable because the IC can only apply where the 
proform is compatible with a clause, and demonstratives are not (1991: 74). This is a rather 
puzzling statement, as Pesetsky himself notices that demonstratives are permitted when the if-
clause is sentence initial, which should not be grammatical if demonstratives were not 
allowed to co-refer with clauses.16   
 
The IC rule also encounters problems with irrealis clauses functioning as complements of 
adjectives. Pesetsky notices as much when he finds himself having to explain away examples 
where non-referential it is absent: 
 
(28) 
 a. I would be happy if Bill were here  
 b. I’d prefer if you turned the lights off.17 
c. I’d be glad if you could be quiet for once. 
 
(Pesetsky 1991: 78-9, ex. 312 and 323) 
 
In these cases the IC rule seems to apply even though there is no it to be replaced by a that-
clause. Pesetsky considers two possible explanations for this, both of which he finds 
unsatisfactory: 
 
Here, however, the object position into which [the that-clause] is inserted is not 
occupied by it. It is either null and present, or structurally absent. If it is null and 
present, we will need to worry about an otherwise unprecedented occurrence of object 
pro in English. […] On the other hand, if I was correct in surmising that [examples like 
(28)] contain no null version of object it, then there is no reason why IC should have to 
apply.  
 
(Pesetsky 1981: 77-78) 
                                                
16 Inexplicably, a few pages earlier (1991: 65), Pesetsky says himself that it is not the only anaphoric 
expression that can be linked to clauses (or the state of affairs associated with a clause), e.g. in his 
example (ex. 257): If unicorns existed, that would be wonderful.   
17 This is one of a series of examples suggested to him by Irene Heim (p.c.) which he finds of dubious 
grammaticality: 
 i) ??I’d hate if Bill didn’t show up. 
 ii) ??I’d love if someone discovered the answer.  
 iii) ??I’d appreciate if you called me tomorrow.  
I agree with his judgement on theses examples, but, as it should be clear, I find examples like (28b) 
above perfectly grammatical. As I will argue below, these examples, possibly more acceptable in AmE, 
are not a problem for my analysis. In fact, they reinforce it.  
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Pesetsky admits that with adjectives such as those in (28a) it is possible to obviate the 
problem by assuming that the adjective is occurring intransitively and considering the if-
clause as an ordinary conditional adjunct (1991: 79). But the same cannot be done for (28b), 
as prefer cannot be used intransitively (*I’d prefer, *I’d be glad, cf the discussion of 
Williams (1974) above).  
 
In sum, the problem with Pesetsky’s analysis, as with Steriade’s, is that they both posit ad hoc 
interpretative rules that are not warranted in any other parts of the grammar. On the contrary, 
an irrealis if account uses categories, principles and constraints that can be seen in other 
constructions, and it does not require new assumptions or ad hoc mechanisms.  
 
 
1.4. Quer (2002) on Spanish.  
 
Finally, I will conclude my review by discussing Quer (2002), who brings together some of 
the analyses and observations summarized so far for Spanish. Spanish has complement 
clauses that are almost word for word translations of the English irrealis clauses: 
 
(29) 
 a. Les     molesta      si   te      miro.  
     them  annoy.3SG  if   you   look-at.1SG 
   ‘It annoys them if I look at you.’ 
  
(Quer 2002: 242, ex 1) 
 
Quer’s analysis of irrealis clauses, however, goes in the opposite direction to what I attempt 
to do here. Whereas my aim is to reclassify if-clauses as irrealis versions of that-clauses, Quer 
attempts to do the opposite, that is, treat that-clauses with irrealis mood as forms of 
conditional clauses. Even though his analysis goes against mine, his study shows the similar 
semantic interpretation between irrealis clauses and the subjunctive mood in languages like 
Spanish. I will use aspects of Quer’s analysis below, but I will refrain from explicitly 
challenging his proposal, as including Spanish in my analysis would be far beyond the reach 






To sum up, in this section I have reviewed the analyses of irrealis if that have been presented 
in the literature. I have shown that the reluctance to consider irrealis clauses as complements 
rather than adjuncts leads authors to posit interpretative rules that are much bigger additions 
to the grammar than an irrealis if would be. Moreover, these rules do not satisfactorily 
account for all the data, and require that more rules be posited for relatively uncontroversial 
phenomena like interrogative or that-clauses. In the next chapter I will show why my account, 










In this chapter I will argue that the italicised items in (1) should be considered internal 
complements introduced by a declarative irrealis subordinator if or when: 
 
(1)  
 a. It would be wonderful if they banned mobile phones from the library.  
 b. I prefer if people don’t talk in the library.  
 c. I would like it if John stopped smoking.  
 d. I hate when people don’t keep their dogs on a leash.  
 e. Imagine if you could just get a plane to the moon! 
 
I will show that, semantically, irrealis clauses share with conditionals the fact that they 
express a hypothetical state of affairs, but that, contrary to what other accounts claim, they do 
not convey a notion of precondition or causality (Comrie 1986). Syntactically, irrealis clauses 
behave largely like complement clauses and not conditional adjuncts, but they also present a 
series of idiosyncrasies that make it difficult at times to assign them an unequivocal label.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. In §2.1, I will illustrate the semantic interpretation of 
irrealis clauses. In §2.2.1, I will discuss the syntactic status of irrealis clauses. In §2.2.2, I will 
deal with the status of irrealis it, that is, the proform that is often found with irrealis clauses. 




2.1. The semantics of irrealis clauses.  
 
The semantic interpretation of sentences in which irrealis clauses are embedded is difficult to 
pin down, and, prima facie, it appears to be identical to conditional constructions. This has led 
both Williams (1974) and Pesetsky (1991) to opt for an interpretation that combines the 
complement fulfilling properties of irrealis clauses with the conditional interpretation of 
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conditional adjuncts. Their interpretation is expressed in the paraphrase of the irrealis clauses 
in (2) with the sentences in (3) (my examples): 
 
(2)  
 a. Frank would be grateful if you left. 
 b. Paul would prefer it if you came. 
 
(3)  
 a. Frank would be grateful that you came if you came.  
 b. Paul would prefer it that you came if you came.  
 
The paraphrases seem to be intuitively correct. If one posits that the irrealis clauses in (2) 
express the state of affairs that Frank and Paul would be grateful for or prefer, and one 
assumes that the conditional reading is always present, the paraphrases seem faultless. At a 
closer look, however, the interpretation in (3) is not satisfactory. As Pullum (1987: 261-2) has 
pointed out, irrealis clauses have an undoubtedly hypothetical character, but they do not 
express a condition. Consider the difference between (4a) and (4b). (4a) is an irrealis clause, 
whereas (4b) is an ordinary conditional.  
 
(4) 
 a. Maria would prefer it if John didn’t tell people.  
 b. If John didn’t tell people, then Maria would prefer it.  
 
 (4a) means that right now, Maria would prefer John’s (hypothetical) silence. (4b), on the 
contrary, means that, given the precondition that John complies to Maria’s wish, then the 
consequence will be that Maria will prefer his silence, or the state of affairs resulting from his 
silence. In the conditional interpretation the state of affairs in the protasis has to 
(hypothetically) occur for the consequence in the apodosis to be true. In the irrealis sentence, 
Maria’s preference does not depend on John’s complying, and there is no implied evaluation 
of any state of affairs resulting from John’s silence.  
 
In his typology of conditional constructions, Comrie (1986) notes that there is usually a 
causal relationship between the protasis and the apodosis of a conditional construction, as it 
can be seen in the oddness of (5): 
 
(5) 
 # If Paris is the capital of France, then two is an even number.  
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 (Comrie 1986: 80, ex. 9) 
 
It is almost impossible to conceive of a causal relationship between irrealis clauses and their 
matrix clauses, as it does not make sense to posit that a preference for a given certain state of 
affairs is the cause of such preference. The absence of conditionality and causality can be 
seen more clearly if one makes time references explicit: 
 
(6)  
 a. Maria would prefer it if John didn’t come tomorrow.  
 b. If John didn’t come tomorrow, then Maria would prefer it.  
 
Again, the difference is very subtle, but it seems to me that in (6a) the act of preferring is set 
firmly in the present, whereas in (6b) Maria’s preferring is construed as occurring tomorrow, 
as a reaction to John’s failure to show up. The different time frames can be seen if we change 
tenses. The irrealis clause is of dubious grammaticality with futurate will in the main clause 
(7a), whilst the ordinary conditional is fine (7b) (the tense in the if-clauses has to change in 
both). Notice that when the expletive it is omitted in (7c), that is, when a conditional 
interpretation is inadmissible from a syntactic point of view, the ungrammaticality of the 
futurate version becomes unquestionable. Moreover, if we make both tenses in the present, 
the opposite effect obtains: the conditional becomes ungrammatical (7d) and the irrealis 
becomes acceptable (7e) 
 
(7)   
 a. ??Maria will prefer it if John doesn’t come tomorrow. 
 b. *Maria will prefer if John doesn’t come tomorrow.  
 c. If John doesn’t come tomorrow, then Maria will prefer it 
d. *If John doesn’t come tomorrow, then Maria prefers it.  
e. Maria prefers it if John doesn’t come tomorrow.  
 
The different behaviour of conditional and irrealis clauses with regards to tense has been 
noticed by Williams (1974) and then Pullum (1987). Pullum points out that (8a) below is only 
acceptable if the it is interpreted exophorically, and that (8b) is ungrammatical because both 
the external and irrealis reading are blocked: 
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 (8)  
a. It will be great if Tracy was there. (e.g. If Tracy was there to cook it, then the 
meal will be great uttered while at the table) 
b. *It will be great if Tracy were there.  
 
(Pullum 1987: 261, ex. 4-5) 
 
 As Pullum notes, (8b) can only be made grammatical by either changing were into an 
indicative form (e.g. was as in (8a)) or by making it into an irrealis by changing will into 
would in the matrix clause (1987:261). 
 
Pullum also explicitly rejects Williams’ (1974) paraphrases by arguing that the irrealis clause 
in (9a) is synonymous with (9b) but not (9c): 
 
(9) 
 a. It would be wonderful if unicorns existed.  
 b. For unicorns to exist would be wonderful.  
 c. If unicorns existed, for unicorns to exist would be wonderful.  
 
(1987: 262, ex. 7) 
 
As Pullum notes, (9a-b) state that there are no unicorns, but that their hypothetical existence 
is wonderful. In contrast, (9c) states that, in a hypothetical world w where unicorns exist, their 
hypothetical existence is wonderful. As it is clear now, the paraphrase in (9c) is incoherent 
because it refers to a non-hypothetical situation (in an alternate world w unicorns do exist) as 
if it were hypothetical.18 This may sound rather convoluted, but it becomes clear if we 
consider one of Steriade’s examples reported in Ch. 1 (ex. 23 in that chapter): 
 
(10) 
 # It would be true if he left.  
 
Now consider a paraphrase of (10) along Williams (1974) and Pesetsky’s (1991) lines: 
 
                                                
18 Pullum uses Stalnaker’s (1968) notion of possible worlds to express these sentences. Thus, (8a) 
means that “there are no unicorns in the actual world wo (I will call this the irrealis presupposition) but 
in that unicorn-containing world wu the existence of unicorns is wonderful.” (1987: 262). 
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(11) 
 If he left, that he left would be true.  
 
There is nothing semantically odd about (11), and yet it is meant to be the logical 
interpretation of a semantically odd sentence. If, instead, we paraphrase (10) following 
Pullum (1987) the result is just as odd as the original sentence: 
 
(12) 
 # That he left is not true, but for it to be true it would be true.  
 
Interestingly, the paraphrases that Pullum uses show a striking similarity between irrealis 
clauses and for-to-clauses. In fact, various authors have pointed out the hypothetical nature of 
for-to-clauses and even linked if-clauses to them. Jespersen, notices that  “the combination of 
for and an infinitive denotes some vague possibility or something imagined” (1914: 304), and 
Bresnan also convenes that for-to complements describe unrealized state of affairs, “both 
future and hypothetical” and are therefore semantically incompatible with predicates which 
“presuppose or imply objective knowledge of truth value” (1972: 83-4). Interestingly, one of 
the examples she chooses to illustrate this point (# It is true for God to exist) is a mirror image 
of (10) above. The hypothetical nature of for-clauses leads her to consider the possibility that 
for-to-clauses might be derived from if-clauses, but she rejects this possibility on the basis 
that the two have too different distributions (1972: 85).  
 
Carstairs takes up Bresnan’s hunch and goes as far as suggesting a “special relationship” 
between certain for-complements and certain if-clauses (1973: 152). He points out that both 
types of clauses only allow iterable predicates (or stage level predicates in Carlson’s 1977 
terms) when introducing complements of factive predicates and when the subject of the 
predicate in the subordinate clause is a definite NP.  
 
(13) 
 a. I hate it for John to be more popular than me.  
 b. *I hate it for John to be taller than me.  
 
(14)  
 a. I hate it if John is more popular than me.  
 b. *I hate it if John is taller than me.  
  
(Carstairs 1973: 148-49, ex. 4 and 15) 
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Moreover, both clauses can be used with counterfactuals:  
 
(15)  
 a. John would hate it for his wife to be learning a foreign language.  
 b. John would hate it if his wife were learning a foreign language.  
 
 (Carstairs 1973: 150, ex. 21-22) 
 
Thus, he concludes, for-to clauses “seem to function semantically as the protasis of a 
conditional” (1973: 152). Following Carstairs and using similar data, Pesetsky (1991) even 
proposes to alter the IC rule that I described in the previous chapter to apply to for-to-clauses 
as well.  
 
I do not wish to dwell here on the exact relationship between for-to-clauses and irrealis if-
clauses, as taking on a further subordinator would be too big a task for a short paper as this 
one (and for is not immune to controversy itself cf. The Cambridge Grammar p.1181-83). 
What I intend to show by stressing the similarities between these subordinators is that it is 
possible, semantically, to have a subordinator that introduces hypothetical clauses without 
implying a conditional meaning. The fact that for-to-clauses have this interpretation whilst 
not bearing any diachronic or synchronic relationship with conditional constructions shows 
this much less controversially than irrealis if.  
 
In fact, other languages also have uncontroversial alternatives to irrealis clauses. In Italian, 
Spanish and Catalan, three languages that allow the subjunctive mood in a much wider range 
of that-clauses, subjunctive that-clauses and irrealis if-clauses are identical in meaning ((16) 
and (17) respectively): 
 
(16) 
 a. Mi     piace           che    la     gente      mi    sorrida.   (Italian) 
     me    please.3SG  that   the    people    me   smile.SUB.3SG 
    “I like it if people smile at me.” 
 b. Les     molesta         que     te       mire.                             (Spanish) 
     they    annoy.3SG   that    you     look-at.SUB.1SG 
    “It annoys them if I look at you.” 
 c. M’agrada                    molt   que   facis                       pastissos.      (Catalan) 
    me-please.IND.3SG    a-lot    if     make.SUB.32SG   cakes 
    “I like it a lot if you make cakes.” 
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 (17)  
 a. Mi      piace           se   la      gente      mi    sorride.                   (Italian) 
     me     please.3SG  if    the    people    me   smile.IND.3SG 
    “I like it if people smile at me.” 
 b. Les     molesta        si     te       miro.                                     (Spanish) 
     they    annoy.3SG  if     you     look-at.IND.1SG 
    “It annoys them if I look at you.” 
 c. M’agrada                    molt    si   fas                         pastissos.         (Catalan) 
    me-please.IND.3SG    a-lot    if   make.IND.32SG   cakes 
    “I like it a lot if you make cakes.” 
 
(The Catalan and Spanish examples are from Quer 2002: 242, ex. 1 and 3) 
 
To conclude, in this section I have argued that irrealis clauses have a semantic interpretation 
that distinguishes them from ordinary conditional clauses. Irrealis clauses refer to 
hypothetical states of affairs on which the matrix predicates expresses a judgement. No 
condition is expressed and no causal relationship is implied between the if-clause and its 




2.2. The syntax of irrealis clauses.  
 
So far I have shown how irrealis clauses differ from ordinary conditional adjuncts in their 
interpretation. I will now turn my attention to the even trickier question of their syntactic 
status. Like Pullum (1987), Lakoff (1968), Noonan (1985) and McCawley (1988) I take the 
view that irrealis if is a member of the subordinator class (complementiser in their terms). 
This means that, syntactically, I claim that irrealis clauses are VP-internal complements 
licensed by the matrix predicate rather than ordinary adjuncts. Thus, my first task will be to 
present a series of syntactic phenomena and tests that show that irrealis clauses behave for the 
most part like complement clauses. As it will become clear, these tests are not all conclusive: 
irrealis if-clauses do show a certain degree of idiosyncrasy, and grammaticality judgements 
are sometimes open to question.  
 
Having argued for the complement status of irrealis clauses, I will proceed to discuss the 
status of the proform it that is often (though not always, as we shall see) found to co-occur 
with them. I will argue, based on Postal and Pullum’s (1988) insights on expletives, that this 
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it is a dummy pronoun that fills the space of the extraposed irrealis clauses, and not a 
cataphoric proform as argued by Steriade (1981) and Rothstein (1995). Finally, in the last 
section I will also put forward the suggestion that when and how might be categorised as 
declarative subordinators as well 
 
 
2.2.1. Irrealis clauses. Complements or conditional adjuncts? 
 
We saw in the literature review that, as noted by Pullum (1987: 261) and Pesetsky (1991: 60-




 a. That panel drops down if anyone pulls this lever.  
 b. *I would prefer it if anyone pulled this lever.  
 
 (Pullum 1987: 261, ex. 3) 
 
Moreover, irrealis clauses do not have an alternative with unless, and they cannot be modified 
by only, but only if, or even :  
 
(19) 
 a. We will go the park tomorrow if it’s sunny.  
 b. We won’t go to the park tomorrow unless it’s sunny.  
 c. We will go to the park even if it’s sunny.  
 d. We will go to the park only if it’s sunny.  
 e. We will go to the park if, but only if, it’s sunny.  
 
(20)  
 a. I would like it if you came to the party tomorrow.  
 b. *I wouldn’t like it unless you came to the party tomorrow. 
 c. *I would like it even if you came to the party tomorrow.  
 d. *I would like it only if you came to the party tomorrow.  
 e. *I would like it if, but only if, you came to the party tomorrow.  
 




a. I’d prefer it if you didn’t tell people yet, please.   
    b. ??If you didn’t tell people yet, I’d prefer it, please.  
 
The crucial claim that irrealis if is a subordinator, however, rests not so much in the different 
constraints on conditional and irrealis clauses in terms of NPIs and modifiers, but on their 
different status within the sentence. You will recall from the discussion of prepositions and 
subordinators in the introduction of this dissertation that complement clauses differ from 
adjuncts in a range of syntactic behaviours. I will now use some of the tests introduced there 
to show the difference between irrealis clauses and ordinary conditional adjuncts.  
 
a) Conditional if can take a range of different complements, from PPs to APs to gerund-
participial complements (22). Attempts to use one of these types of dependents with irrealis if 
result in ungrammaticality (unless, of course, the it is interpreted exophorically)19: 
 
(22) 
  a. If in doubt, see me.  
 b. If known, such facts have been reported.  
 c. If possible, you should test all moving parts.  
 d. If coming by car, take the A10 and turn off at the A414.  
 
(23) 
 a. *I’d prefer it if in doubt.  
 b. *I like it if known.  
 c. *It’d be grateful if possible.  
 d. *It’d be wonderful if coming by car. 
 
The unacceptability of sentences in (23) may be considered a consequence of the fact that, 
semantically, the it in the matrix clause has nothing to (cataphorically) refer to in the 
conditional adjunct. It is indeed the case that ordinary conditional clauses with a sentence 
initial if-clause of the types above are equally odd (again, the it has to be interpreted as 
referring to the if-clause) 
 
(24)  
 a. *If possible, I would prefer it.  
                                                
19 From here onwards I will just assume, unless otherwise stated, that the exophoric reading is not 
available and I will judge clauses accordingly.  
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 b. *If coming by car, I like it.  
 
Note, however, that irrealis clauses that are not preceded by it are just as unacceptable 
without a finite verb: 
 
(25)  
 a. *Imagine if coming by car! 
 b. *I hate if kept refrigerated.   
 c. *I prefer if in doubt.  
 
b) With regards to WH-extraction, conditional adjuncts are strong islands, but extraction from 
irrealis clauses is acceptable.  
 
(26)  
 a. I would stop reading The Times if they put up a pay wall.  
 b. *What would you stop reading The Times if they put up __? 
 
(27)  
 a. People would hate it if newspapers put up pay walls.  
 b. What would people hate it if newspapers put up __? 
 
Relativization also shows the same pattern. Conditional adjuncts do not allow extraction, but 
irrealis clauses do: 
 
(28)  
a. *A contract that you will receive your money back if you sign __and return__ to 
us.  
b. A contract which I would be grateful if you could sign __and return __to us.  
c. A contract which I would hate it if I had to sign __and return __to those 
crooks.20  
 
c) Conditional adjuncts cannot be the focus of a pseudo cleft (29a-b), whereas irrealis clauses 
are acceptable in this position (29c-d) (Pullum 1987: 266):  
 
 
                                                
20 (28b) is an attested example found by Geoffrey Pullum in an email addressed to him (p.c.). 
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(29) 
 a. Pibe would look great if the trimmed his beard.  
 b. *What Pibe would look great is if he trimmed his beard.  
 c. I would really hate it if I had no money.  
 d. What I would really hate is if I had no money.  
   
It-clefts are particularly useful in showing the difference between the different function of 




a. My parents hate it if I don’t wash up.  
b. It’s if I don’t wash up that my parents hate__. 
c. It’d be wonderful if he did the dishes properly. 
 d. It’s if he did the dishes properly that __would be wonderful.21 
 
(31) 
 a. The council will close the school if the government cuts the budget.   
b. It’s if the government cuts the budget that the council will close the school.   
 
In the it-clefts in (30) there are a transitive verb (hate) occurring without a direct object or an 
internal complement and a verb (would be) occurring without a subject. This is only possible 
because they do have a complement and subject, but they have simply been moved to the 
front. If we removed the it-cleft parts of the sentences the remaining clauses would not be 
grammatical, because they would lack their obligatory complements. (31b), on the contrary, 
would be perfectly grammatical even without the foregrounded element, as it would only be 
missing an optional adjunct.  
d) When irrealis clauses are found with adjuncts, the irrealis clause has to be nearer the verb 
than the adjunct, as it is to be expected if it is a complement: 
 
                                                
21 The Cambridge Grammar (p. 1418) argues that content clauses are not readily foregrounded: 
 
i) # It’s that he did it deliberately that I’m inclined to think.  
ii) # It’s why no one told us that I’m wondering.  
 
My informants do not find (ii) particularly ungrammatical, and similar sentences become more 
acceptable if one imagines them within a larger discourse, as in the following:  
A: It’d be wonderful if he did the dishes every now and then.  




a. It would be preferable if you could contact me in person if you have any complaints.  
b. *It would be preferable if you have any complaints if you could contact me in 
person.22  
 
Not all syntactic tests, however, point towards complement status for irrealis clauses. With 
regards to auxiliary-stranding ellipsis23, irrealis clauses do not behave as complements. As 
The Cambridge Grammar notes (p. 1520), it is common in this kind of ellipsis for all 
dependents of VP to be omitted. However, in some cases some elements may be retained, but 




a. *Kim had seemedi fairly confident even though Pat had __i [extremely 
pessimistic].  
b. *I haven’t [put the TV]i in the bedroom: I have __i [in the lounge].  
c. You can’t [cut that]i with scissors though you probably could__i [with a razor 
blade].  
 
(The Cambridge Grammar, p.1520, ex. 3) 
 
(33a-b) are unacceptable because the items in brackets are both complements. Conversely, 
(33c) is fine because with a razor blade is not a complement, but just an adjunct. Given what 
I have shown so far, we would expect that if we apply this test to irrealis clauses and 
conditional adjuncts the former would not be allowed to be retained. This, however, is not the 
case. Consider the following: 
 
(34) 
 a. *I’m hoping that it will rain and John is that it will snow.  
 b. ?I would like it if it rained and John would if it snowed.  
c. I will tell them their results if they phone and John will if they come in person. 
 
                                                
22 (32b) would be acceptable with intonation breaks on either side of the adjunct, i.e. It would be 
preferable, if you have any complaints, if you contacted me in person. In this case, however, the item 
within the commas would be a supplement, that is an element that is not integrated in the syntactic 
structure of the clause (cf. The Cambridge Grammar p. 1350) and not an adjunct.  
23 The Cambridge Grammar (p. 1520, f. 39) uses this term instead of the more common ‘VP deletion’ 
or ‘VP ellipsis’ because what is deleted is not necessarily a VP.  
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As we can see in (34) that-clauses are definitely ungrammatical in these contexts, but native 
speakers do not have the same expected reaction with irrealis clauses. I have decided to mark 
(34b) with a ?, however, because it does not seem quite as acceptable as (34c) where a 
conditional adjunct is retained. I do not have an explanation for this data other than that fuzzy 
behaviour should be expected in a construction that has possibly only emerged recently.  
 
A similar inconsistency is flagged up by Steriade, and I have briefly covered it in my previous 
chapter (ex. 21-22). I repeat her example here as (35): 
 
(35)  
a. Just how sorry that he left do you think you are? 
 b. *Just how sorry if he left do you think you are? 
 
(Steriade 1981: 9, ex. 23-4) 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the ungrammaticality of (35b) is due to the fact that sorry 
if the left is not a constituent like sorry that he left. This apparently shows that in these cases 
irrealis clauses are not complement clauses. However, if we consider that most complement 
irrealis if-clauses have to be extraposed (and leave a dummy it behind), it is possible to 
explain (35) as a consequence of the fact that the if-clause is extraposed, and that a null 
element, rather than a dummy it, is left behind. In this sense, adjective predicates seem to an 
extent to resist the assimilation of irrealis if-clauses to full complement status that we see with 
verbs, where extra position is no longer necessary with certain predicates (prefer, imagine, 
etc. see below).   
 
The peculiar behaviour of adjectives is noted also by Pesetsky (1991: 78), who notices that, 
when functioning as complement of adjectives, irrealis clauses allow NPIs. This, as we saw 
earlier in this section, constitutes one of the most reliable ways of distinguishing between 
conditionals and irrealis clauses. Consider (36): 
 
(36)  
 a. I would be happy if Bill won anything.  
 b. Mary would be glad if anyone came. 
 c. Sue would be proud if her team could complete at all. 
 
(Pesetsky 1991: 78, ex. 321) 
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The data in (36) should point towards an ordinary conditional interpretation, but there is also 
evidence which calls for caution before dismissing the irrealis analysis altogether. Pesetsky 
notes that there is a subtle semantic difference between if-clauses that follow transitive 




 a. Mary would be glad if the war were over.  
 b. Sue would be somber if her fish died.  
 
(Pesetsky 1991: 78, ex. 319-20) 
 
Pesetsky points out that in (37a) the war being over is the subject of Mary’s happiness, but in 
(37b) the subject of Sue’s somberness is not necessarily he fish’s death. Moreover, returning 
to Pesetsky’s observation on NPIs above, a pattern seems to emerge that brings the semantic 
differences above together. Pesetsky (1991: 78) notices that the presence of NPIs in these 
contexts becomes less acceptable when adjectives like glad are used in a way that makes the 
complement reading stronger, as when it is used as a polite request, when it approaches the 
meaning of want (cf. also ex 21 above):  
 
(38)  
 a. # I’d be glad if you turned any lights off. Thank you.  
 b. # It’s so hot! I’d be very glad if you brought me anything.  
 
(Pesetsky 1991: 78, ex. 322) 
 
Finally, it should be noted that irrealis clauses have a more limited distribution than 
declarative that-clauses, as they cannot occur as subjects, complements of prepositions, and, 




 a. That you travelled that far for me is wonderful.  
 b. *If you travelled that far for me would be wonderful.  
 c. I adore that you are always on time. 
d. *I would adore if you could come tomorrow.  
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e. Considering that they asked me, I will bring some extra food.  
f. *Considering if they asked me, I would bring some extra food.  
 
These differences are noticed by all the authors that have concerned themselves with irrealis 
clauses, and, with the exception of Pullum, they all reject the subordinator hypothesis on the 
basis of these differences. I do not think, however, that the constraints in (39) are a strong 
enough reason to do so, especially in the face of the large body of evidence that I have 
presented so far. Moreover, the constraint on appearing in complement position without an 
expletive (39d) is not as strong as it may have seemed to some authors when they were 
writing twenty years ago. As I have hinted at already, prefer, imagine and probably even 
appreciate already allow irrealis clauses in that position. The following are all from the 
written section of the COCA and their grammaticality is uncontroversial: 
 
(40)  
a. Imagine if we all got together and turned against the Nazis. 
b. If she’s going to collect the locks, we would appreciate if she didn't bring hem 
to school. 
c. Tell him that next time you’d prefer if he consulted you before blowing the 
budget on a big-ticket item. 
 
Moreover, like, love, and especially hate also seem to be following the same path, as these 
examples from the internet show: 
 
(41) 
 a. I would like if each email account showed in its own notification. 
b. I agree. I would hate if my dead links where deleted without me knowing. 
 c. I would love if I could somehow get the Obamas to adopt my baby.24 
  
But the strongest argument against using distributional differences between irrealis if and 
declarative subordinator that as reasons for rejecting a subordinator label is that interrogative 
subordinator if also shows many distributional differences with the other interrogative 
subordinator whether. Interrogative if is not allowed in the following constructions: 
 
 
                                                
24 (41a): http://www.precentral.net/dear-palm-what-we-need-next-updates 
(41b) http://deliciousforum.com/forum/comments.php?DiscussionID=404 
(41c) https://twitter.com/QuinnFabrayGLEE [All accessed 28th July 2010] 
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(42)  
a. I’m going to see her whether/*if you like it or not. (Exhaustive conditional 
construction). 
b. She can’t make up her mind whether/*if to accept. (Infinitival complement 
clause).  
c. Whether/*if this was the right decision remains unclear. (Subject).  
d. Whether/*if it will work we shall soon find out. (Preposed complement).  
e. I don’t know whether/*if or not she’ll accept. (When or not follows the 
subordinator).  
f. This question, whether/*if the commissioner exceeded the terms of reference, 
will need to be carefully investigated. (Supplement to an NP).25  
 
(The Cambridge Grammar p.974, ex. 7-11) 
 
As we can see, the range of differences between whether and if is much larger than between 
irrealis if and that, but this does not lead us to doubt that an interrogative subordinator if 
exists. I believe that the same should be said of irrealis if. Given the wealth of evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that it exists, the few distributional differences in (39) and the few 
idiosyncrasies that I have discussed so far should not prevent us from positing a third if.  
 
In sum, in this section I have argued that there are sufficient syntactic phenomena to warrant 
the claim that English has a third type of if, that is, a subordinator that introduces irrealis 
content clauses functioning as subjects or complements inside the matrix VP. I have dealt 
with some of the phenomena that seem to argue against my claim, but I have shown that these 
are either minor distributional differences that can occur among members of the same 
grammatical class, or idiosyncrasies influenced by the semantics of the matrix predicates.  
 
In the next section I will deal with the question of the status of the proform it that often occurs 
with irrealis clauses.  
 
 
2.2.2. Irrealis clauses and expletives.  
 
In Ch. 1 I briefly alluded to the fact that previous studies of irrealis if have refused to consider 
the it that often accompanies them as an expletive. This refusal is probably due to the fact that 
                                                
25 The Cambridge Grammar also lists ‘complement to be’ as an ungrammatical function for 
interrogative if-clauses. Cf. this dissertation, p. 6, f. 2.  
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when it appears in a direct object slot its position requires one to acknowledge that expletives 
may occur in θ-marked positions, thus breaching Chomsky’s θ criterion that “each argument 
bears one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role si assigned to one and only on argument” 
(1981: 36).  
 
As Postal and Pullum explain, the refusal to accept that expletives may occur in direct object 
position is difficult to defend, as it rests on circular thinking: 
 
Under certain currently defended versions of grammatical theory, this claim is the sole 
independent support that has been given for the claim that subcategorized positions are 
always θ-marked; and the latter claim is the sole basis of an intratheoretical bar against 
analyzing the accusative NP in an accusative and infinitive construction as a derived 
matrix clause direct object.  
 
 (Postal and Pullum 1988: 635) 
 
This attitude is particularly puzzling considering that, as Postal and Pullum have shown, there 
is ample evidence that expletives routinely occur in θ-marked positions. Here are some of the 
many examples they present (the first 3 are from Rosenbaum 1967): 
 
(43) 
 a. I dislike it that he is so cruel.  
 b. I don’t suspect it for a moment that you would fail.  
 c. They doubt it very much that you will go.  
 d. We can take it for granted that there will be an appeal.  
 e. I blame it on you that we can’t go.  
 
(Postal and Pullum 1988: 642-43, ex. 21-22) 
 
Notice than none of these examples include irrealis clauses, and that they all involve 
subordinators and complement clauses whose status is unquestioned in the literature. 
Refusing the irrealis if hypothesis on the basis that it breaches the θ-criterion would involve 
also rejecting perfectly grammatical examples like (43).  
 
Faced with these examples, many authors have attempted to find a function for these 
expletives that does not involve breaching the θ-criterion. Rothstein (1995: 519) argues that 
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they are neither dummies nor proforms cataphorically related to the following clause, but that 
they refer to “something already broached –an event already mentioned or for other reasons 
contextually prominent.” As an example of this external, pragmatic antecedent Rothstein 
borrows an example from Bolinger (1977): 
 
(44) 
a. If he asks you to help him, just say that you regret (*it) that you can’t. 
b. You shouldn’t regret it that you were helpful.  
 
(Bolinger 1977: Ch. 4, ex. 39-40, cited in Rotstein 1990:520) 
 
The difference, Bolinger and Rothstein argue, is due to the fact that in (44a) the complement 
of regret is a hypothetical “nonspecific object”, whereas in (44b) it is an actual event, and 
only the latter can be the antecedent of it.   
 
Rothstein’s argument resembles very closely Kiparsky and Kiparsky’s notion of ‘factive it’ 
(1970). ‘Factive it’ is the it that co-occurs with that-clauses functioning as complements of 
factive predicates, and Kiparsky and Kiparsky consider it as an optional reduced form of 
‘fact’, a deep structure component of factive complements (1970:156-7). In their analysis of 
factive predicates’ complements, sentences of the type ‘I regret that John is ill’ appear as ‘I 
regret the fact that John is ill’ in deep structure. Whilst they do not consider factive it a 
referential pronoun in Rothstein’s terms, they make a point of distinguishing it from expletive 
it, and they give similar readings of minimal pairs like the one in (45). In (45a) expect is not a 
factive predicate, and its complement is not presupposed. When it is present, however, as in 
(50b), expect is interpreted factively, and its complement is interpreted as being presupposed. 
The items in brackets clarify the difference in meaning:  
 
(45)   
a. I had expected that there would be a big turnout (but only three people came). 
b. I had expected it that there would be a big turnout (this is ridiculous, get more 
chairs).  
 
(Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970: 166) 
The difference seems clear, but it is not across the board. Many of the examples that Postal 
and Pullum (1988) present have neither a ‘factive reading’ nor an external one, and irrealis 
clauses are perfect counterexamples to Rothstein and Bolinger’s claim that it can only refer to 
actual events. Moreover, as Kim and Sag (2005) argue, against Rothstein, the presence or 
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absence of it seems to be lexically subcategorised, as various counterexamples can be found 
to any attempt to find clear patterns for its appearance. The notion of factivity is indeed an 
intriguing one for our analysis, for, as Pullum (1987), Pesetsky (1991), and Quer (2002) have 
noted, irrealis clauses seem to occur only with factive predicates. Nonetheless, the fact that 
dummy it can also occur in non-factive environments does not point to factivity as a 
satisfactory analytical tool. What is more, whilst factivity does seem to have some bearing on 
the syntax of complements, it belongs more to the realms of semantics than syntax, and it 
cannot explain the clear and across the board syntactic differences between expletives and 
referential pronouns.  
 
In their discussion of expletives in subcategorized position, Postal and Pullum (1988) provide 
four syntactic tests that make it possible to distinguish between expletives from ordinary 
referential it. If applied to irrealis clauses these tests show that irrealis it cannot but be 
considered an expletive. As a comparison I will use the examples given by Postal and Pullum 
(1988). Tho their tests I also add –in e) and f)– two more by Seppänen (2002). 
 
a) Expletive NPs do not support Emphatic Reflexives: 
 
(46) 
a. *It can itself rain upward if the wind is right. 
b. *I’d like it itself if users could set a limit on the length of comments.  
 
b) Expletive NPs do not coordinate with other expletives or other items: 
 
(47)  
a. *It and there was respectively proved to be raining and claimed to be a flood in 
the valley.  
b. *I would have loved it and its consequence for the country if Ghana had won 
the World Cup.  
 
c) Expletive NPs do not appear in nominalization of-phrases: 
 
 (48) 
a. my observation of it falling/*raining.  
b. *my liking of it if Ghana won the World Cup.  
 
d) Expletive NPs do not appear in tough movement subjects:  
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 (49)  
a. *It was tough to prevent t from becoming obvious that things were out of control.  
b. *It will be hard to prevent from being newsworthy if Karen were elected.26  
 
e)  Expletive NPs cannot bear contrastive stress (Seppänen 2002: 451): 
 
(50) 
a. *Raining? No IT isn’t raining, IT is snowing.  
b. *Wonderful? No, IT would be horrible if they came.  
c. *Like it? I hate IT if I run out of tea! 
 
f) (Following from e), expletive NPs cannot be the focus of it-clefts (Seppänen 2002: 451): 
 
(51)  
a. *I hope it isn’t it that is snowing.  
b. *I hope you don’t think it is it that would be wonderful if they came.  
c.* I’m horrified that it is it that you would like if they came.  
 
The question of the referential or otherwise status of irrealis it is raised also by Pesetsky 
(1991). You will recall from the previous chapter that Pesetsky argues that the If-Copying 
interpretative rule (IC) is only allowed to apply when the if-clause is post-verbal and the it 
functioning as direct object is non-referential. His analysis of the proform it would seem to 
coincide with that of Postal and Pullum (1988) and Pullum (1987), who consider the it in 
question as an expletive. Nonetheless, Pesetsky rejects this option, for he claims that 
expletives quite simply do not exist as a syntactic item. He defines expletives as semantically 
empty (non-referring) items that are not assigned θ-roles. He then claims that in irrealis 
clauses these two conditions fail to coincide because, at the same time, the it can be θ-marked 
before the IC applies and, once the IC applies and replaces it with a clause, the semantics 
never needs to interpret it (and, in theory, assign it no meaning): 
 
This makes it impossible to ask whether this object it is or is not an expletive. It is an 
expletive in that it does not receive any semantic interpretation. It is a non-expletive in 
that it receives a θ-role at all levels before the IC applies. 27 
                                                
26 Example (49b) is from Pullum (1987: 263, ex. 15). He notes that the sentence is grammatical with 
was instead of were “only as a (rather odd) conditional claim, with the meaning ‘If Karen was elected, 
then it will be hard to prevent from being newsworthy’, where it can refer to anything” (Pullum 1987: 
264).  
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 (Pesetsky 1991: 74)  
 
One of the problems with this analysis of it is that it cannot account for declarative non 
irrealis extraposed clauses such as those presented in Postal and Pullum (1988). Excluding an 
expletive it in cases like these would require another interpretative rule to apply in these cases 
as well, but it is hard to imagine what this rule would be, and why it would be a good idea to 
posit a rule that triggers a representation that is either identical to non-extraposed clauses 
(52a-b), or that is just gibberish (52c-d): 
 
(52) 
 a. I like that the sun is shining.  
 b. That the sun is shining is great.  
c. I like that the sun is shining that the sun is shining. 
 d. That the sun is shining is great that the sun is shining.  
 
Extraposition can account for these clauses without problems, but it requires a) that one 
recognize the existence of expletives and b) that one accept that the θ-criterion might be, alas, 
wrong.  
 
The tests presented above are not the only reason for exlcluding a referential function for 
irrealis it. There are two other important arguments in favour of an expletive analysis. Firstly, 
as we saw in Ch. 1 when discussing Pesetesky’s proposal, no other proforms can substitute 
irrealis it (ex. 26 from Ch. 1): 
 
(53)  
 a. *I would love thati [if unicorns existed]i.  
 b. *We can enjoy thisi without shame [if unicorns exist]i.  
 c. *I would prefer thisi if Kim [were not informed]i. 
 
Secondly, an anaphoric element in this position would breach the Backwards Anaphora 
Constraint (Bresnan 1971, Postal 1972). As The Cambridge Grammar (pp. 1475-1480) 
argues, constraints on anaphora are still not entirely understood, so one should be careful not 
to overstate the BAC. However, if we try to place anaphoric elements in similar position to 
irrealis it, that is, inside the matrix VP or as subjects, the result is clearly ungrammatical: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
27 The levels Pesetsky refers to are D-structure, S-structure and LF. The IC rule is a post-LF rule.  
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(54)  
 a. *Mary told himi that Johni had to leave.  
 b. *Hei was happy that Johni had won.  
 
Moreover, we should also ask whether it in subject position can ever be cataphoric to a clause 
at the end of the VP. We can test this using a verb that does not allow extraposition, like mean 
or entail : 
 
(55) 
 a. That she is a witch entails that we have to kill her.  
 b. It entails that we have to kill her that she is a witch.  
 
Of course, these verbs do allow a referential it when it is anaphoric as opposed to cataphoric, 
that is when it follows its antecedent (56a), even when the antecedent is an if-clause. If we try 
to move its antecedent to after the VP, however, the result is unacceptable: 
 
(56) 
 a. [If she were a witch]i itiwould entail that we have to kill her.  
 b. ?? It would entail that we have to kill her if she were a witch.  
 
We can assume from (56) that an if-clause at the end of the sentence cannot act as antecedent 
for a cataphoric it in subject postion. But this is precisely the position where we find 
extraposed subject if-clauses. This cannot but lead us to conclude, together with the other 
reasons shown so far, that the it in extraposed clauses cannot be referentially linked to the 
extraposed irrealis clause, that is, that it cannot but be an expletive.   
 
Finally, a look at other languages that differentiate between expletives and referential 
pronouns can throw further light on the status of irrealis it. Iatridou and Embick (1997) show 
that, contrarily to English, pro-drop languages have strict constraints on the type of 
antecedents that pro can take. They present data from Modern Greek, Spanish, Catalan, 
Italian and Bulgarian. Here I will show just data from Italian (the examples are adapted from 
the Catalan examples in Iatridou and Embick 1997).  
 
In Italian pro cannot have a clause as antecedent, as it can be seen in (57): 
 
(57)  
a. *Se [arriviamo tardi]i  proi  piacerà               a    Maria  
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      If   arrive.1PL late     pro   please. FUT.3SG   to   Maria 
      ‘If we arrive late it will please Maria’ 
 
Italian has a different anaphoric element for clauses, ció: 
 
(58)  
a. *Se [arriveremo tardi]i ciòi  piacerà                  a   Maria  
      If   arrive.1PL late     this    please. FUT.3SG   to   Maria 
     ‘If we arrive late this will please Maria’. 
 
Finally, in Italian expletive subjects are null, so care should be taken to distinguish the 
ungrammatical example in (57) with the expletive subject below: 
 
(59)  
a. Se  arriviamo   tardi  pro   sarà                 una vergogna. 
                If  arrive.1PL    late    pro   be.FUT.3SG    a     shame 
                ‘It will be a shame if we arrive late.’ 
 
We can see that whereas English does not differentiate between referential and expletive it, 
Italian distinguishes between expletive (pro) and proforms with clausal antecedents (ciò). As 
expected given the analysis presented in this paper, there is a clear difference in Italian 
between irrealis complement clause, where pro is used, and ordinary conditional clauses. 
Notice how Pullum’s unicorns examples are translated in Italian (1987): 
 
(60)  
a. It would be wonderful if unicorns existed.  
b. Se gli unicorni esistessero sarebbe meraviglioso.  
c. If unicorns existed then it would be verifiable.  
d. *Se gli unicorni esistessero sarebbe verificabile.  
e. Se gli unicorni esistessero ció sarebbe verificabile.  
 
 
2.3. When and how.  
 
Before I conclude this chapter, I should mention that subordinator status should probably also 
be extended to two items that can appear in contexts that closely resemble irrealis clauses. 
Consider the following examples: 
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(61)  
 a. I hate (it) when people say that learning Latin teaches you to be logical.  
b. I hate (it) how classicists think they know more about grammar than linguists.   
 
In the clauses in (61) the states of affairs in the when and how clauses are the logical 
argument of hate. (61a) is very similar in meaning to irrealis if-clauses, as it should be 
expected given the semantic similarities between when and if (cf. Traugott 1986, Kratzer 
1995). When-clauses are not as hypothetical as if-clauses, and indeed (61a) seems to imply 
that the fact that people make unsubstantiated claims about Latin is a real occurrence. In fact, 
when clauses are not possible when the verb in the matrix clause is in irrealis mood. How-
clauses appear closer to that-clauses than irrealis ones, as they do not convey any degree of 
irreality, and they are also not possible with the matrix verb in irrealis mood.  
 
The case for subordinator status for how and when seems even stronger than for irrealis if, as 
their occurrence without expletive it is undoubtedly more acceptable and more common than 
with if-clauses. In fact, how is already recognised as a subordinator in The Cambridge 
Grammar (p. 954), which notes that how can be used as a variant of that in informal style 
without “any trace of its usual manner or degree meaning” and that in these cases it has 
clearly lost its interrogative status and has been reanalysed as a declarative subordinator. The 
Cambridge Grammar also notes that because of its interrogative origins, this type of how is 
found only with predicates that can take interrogative as well as declarative complements (p. 
954). This claim is however refuted by examples like (61b), or other pefectly acceptable (if 
colloquial) examples with factive predicates like like, love, etc.: 
 
(62) 
 a. It’s astonishing how they are trying to convinve us that the cuts are good for us.  
 b. I love how he’s still the same man after all this time.   
c. I like how you point out that action figures for boys are never deemed 
unrealistic.  
 
Given the other uses of these items, care should be taken not to confuse declarative how and 
when with their interrogative, exlamative (for how) and relative counterparts:  
 
(63) 
 a. I love how you’ve styled your hair! (fused relative) 
 b. They asked us when they could come and visit. (interrogative) 
 c. It’s amazing how many people came! (exclamative) 
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There is not enough space here to pursue the question of the status of when-clauses and how-
clauses, but it is interesting to note that their movement from interrogative or adjunct clauses 





In this chapter I have presented semantic and syntactic evidence that English has a third if, 
that is, a declarative subordinator that introduces irrealis clauses functioning as internal 
complements. I have shown that irrealis clauses refer to hypothetical states of affairs, but that 
they do not convey the idea of condition like ordinary conditional if-clauses. Syntactically, 
irrealis clauses also differ from conditional adjunct in a series of ways. Irrealis if cannot be 
replaced by other prepositions or phrases that have conditioanl meaning, like provided that or 
unless, and cannot be modified by even, only or but only if. Moreover, irrealis clauses are not 
NPI licensing contexts like conditional adjuncts. Most importantly, irrealis clauses fulfill a 
different function in phrase structure. Most tests of complementhood –such as extraction, 
preposing, clefting and constituent ordering– show that irrealis clauses are VP-internal 
complements and not adjuncts. I also showed that irrealis clauses are often exraposed, either 
from their subjcet or object position, and that an expletive it takes their place as the syntactic 
subject or direct object. I argued that extraposition is the only tenable account, as syntactic 
tests show that the it that cooccurs with irrealis clauses is subject to all the constraints of 
expletives, and is barred from being a referential pronoun by various anaphoric constraints.  
Finally, I concluded the chapter by suggesting that the subordinator class be enlarged to when 
and how as well. In the next chapter, I will consider the case of if with dubitative predicates, 











In this chapter I will discuss a possible candidate for the new label of subordinator-if that I 
have not mentioned so far. This is the if that occurs in subordinate clauses functioning as 
internal complements of doubt, as in the example below.  
 
(1)  
I doubt if the monarchy will last. 
 
The main reason for suspecting that this if may not be an interrogative subordinator is that, 
semantically, the clause in (1) does not express a question. The Cambridge Grammar (p. 984) 
points out that doubt expresses “an inclination to believe that the embedded proposition is 
true” rather than an uncertainty or query. Thus, the embedded clause does not contain, like 
other interrogatives, a variable x (or an index-dependent denotation, cf. Groenendijk & 
Stokhof 1982: 177) but is a full proposition with truth conditions, or index-independent 
denotation. This is made evident by the fact that or not cannot be added to if-clauses licensed 
by doubt, as or not can only be used when a variable is involved.  
 
Doubt also licenses declaratives introduced by that. Whilst other predicates (e.g. know, tell 
etc.) can also license different types of complements, with doubt there is no difference in 
meaning between a declarative and an interrogative complement. We can see this contrast in 
(2) and (3).  
 
(2)  
a. She didn’t say that she wrote it.  
 b. She didn’t say whether she wrote it.  
 
(3)   
a. I doubt that she wrote it.  
 b. I doubt whether she wrote it.   
 
(The Cambridge Grammar, p. 984, ex. 46) 
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As The Cambridge Grammar notes, in the situation described by (2a) but not by (2b) she may 
have said ‘I didn’t’ write it’. In (3) however, there is no semantic difference at all between a 
and b, with both meaning something like “I don’t think it’s true that she wrote it.” It seems 
clear, then, that there is at the very least a mismatch between syntax and semantics when it 
comes to clauses licensed by doubt. This may lead one to suspect that the if in question may 
not be an interrogative subordinator at all.  
 
A main objection to considering complements of doubt as interrogative is that doubt does not 
license open interrogatives or directive interrogatives: 
 
(4)   
a. *I doubt what colour they prefer.  
 b. *I doubt where they went.  
 c. *I doubt who they invited.  
 d. *I doubt whether to go.  
 
Similarly, doubt does not allow a concealed question reading when its complement is a 
definite NP. Instead the definite article as to be interpreted anaphorically (with the antecedent 
retrieved from larger discourse): 
 
(5)   
a. They asked me the age of my dog (=They asked me what the age of my dog 
was)  
b. I doubt the age of his dog. (=I call into question the truth/validity of the 
aforementioned age of his dog.) 
 
As Huddleston (1993) has argued in establishing the interrogative nature of complements of 
predicates like ‘you won’t believe’, the fact that one predicate takes one type of interrogative 
does not mean that it must take all other subtypes. Huddleston shows that predicate selection 
is sensitive to a range of syntactic and semantic factors such as whether the predicate is 
answer or question oriented –that is, whether knowledge of the answer is implied or not– and 
whether the question expressed is an information question (with statements as answers) or a 
deliberative or direction question (with directives as answers). Thus, the fact that certain 
predicates may select only one of many types of interrogatives should not, by itself, make us 
question the interrogative nature of those clauses. Notice, for example the restrictions on 




a. He realized who she was.  
 b. *He realized whether he was dead (or not) 
 
(7) 
a. She knew/predicted how he would do it.  
 b. She knew/*predicted how to do it.  
 
(Huddleston 1993: 182-183, ex. 29 and 31) 
 
The fact that doubt does not take all possible types of interrogative complements is not a 
sufficient reason for considering doubt-if-clauses as irrealis clauses. It should also be 
ascertained if they have features that make them decidedly declarative and, therefore, possibly 
irrealis. Katz and Postal (1964: 87-89) have shown that scarcely and hardly can only occur in 
declarative clauses, but not questions:  
 
(8)   
a. He scarcely eats.  
 b. *Does he scarcely eat? 
  c. He hardly eats.  
d. *Does he hardly eat? 
 
As Baker (1979: 130-31) notes, the same constraints apply to interrogative clauses. Doubt-if-
clauses behave as interrogatives with regards to these items: 
 
(9)   
a. *I doubt if/whether he scarcely eats.  
 b. *I doubt if/whether he hardly eats.  
 
Notice that when that is used, the result seems at least more acceptable: 
 
(10)  
a. ?I doubt that he scarcely eats.  
 b. ?I doubt that he hardly eats.  
 
Baker also suggests other items as possible tests for interrogative status, namely 
ever/sometimes and any/some. These tests, however, are not illuminating in the case of doubt, 
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as these items may be simply licensed by the fact that doubt creates a negative context. Whilst 
NPIs can be used as diagnostics to distinguish positive declaratives from interrogatives, the 
fact that they are sensitive to non-affirmative contexts in general does not allow us to use their 
distribution as a way of discerning among different types of non-affirmative environments 
(cf. The Cambridge Grammar pp. 822-823).  Thus, while it is true that doubt-if-clauses allow 
NPIs, so do declaratives when they are licensed by a covertly negative predicate like deny: 
 
(11)  
 a. I doubt if anyone will come.  
 b. He denied that there was anything wrong with the meal.  
 
Finally, the behaviour of doubt-if-clauses with regard to modality shows that they cannot be 
considered irrealis clauses. In Ch.2 I showed, following Pullum (1987), that irrealis clauses 
cannot function as complements of predicates with will. If we use will with doubt and we 
keep the verb in the if-clause realis, no ungrammaticality ensues: 
 
(12) 
 a. *It will be great if Tracy was here. (External reading only). 
b. When she regains consciousness she will doubt if she was able to walk before.  
 
Notice also that, semantically, doubt does not appear to make sense with an irrealis clauses: 
 
(13) 
 a. # I would doubt it if unicorns existed. 
 b. # I would doubt the hypothetical existence of unicorns.  
 
Semantically, (13b) is decidedly odd, as it seems to repeat the same idea twice, that is, that I 
think that the hypothetical existence of unicorns is hypothetical. Once again, the fact that 
doubt is not a factive predicate may have a bearing on the incompatibility of an irrealis 





In this chapter I have shown that there are no syntactic grounds for considering doubt-if-
clauses as anything other than interrogative. The mismatch between syntax and semantics of 
these clauses has to be considered as the result of the idiosyncrasy of dubitative predicates 
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rather than as evidence for the existence of a different type of if. As far as I am aware, there 
are no other types of predicates that show a similar mismatch and that could therefore license 
this non-interrogative if. Thus, it seems more parsimonious to simply attribute the syntax 
semantics mismatch to doubt than positing the existence of a special subordinator that only 






According to The Cambridge Grammar’s revision of the preposition and subordinator classes, 
English has two if’s: a preposition that heads conditional adjuncts, and an interrogative 
subordinator, that is, a meaningless non-head marker of subordination. In this dissertation I 
have argued that a third if should be posited: a declarative subordinator that introduced irrealis 
clauses. Following Pullum (1987) I have called it irrealis if.  
 
I have presented evidence that strongly suggests that irrealis if-clauses function like VP-
internal complements or subjects, and not like adjuncts. In syntactic tests like extraction, 
preposing, and clefting, irrealis clauses behave predominantly like complements. Moreover, 
no other preposition with conditional or concessive meaning can be used to replace irrealis if, 
which strongly suggest that irrealis clauses should not be considered conditional protases. A 
close analysis of the semantics of irrealis clauses also points towards a non-conditional 
analysis.  
 
Most irrealis clauses co-occur with the proform it in the subject or direct object position. This 
has led some authors (Steriade 1981 and Pesetsky 1991) to suggest that irrealis clauses should 
be considered ordinary conditional adjuncts that, through interpretative rules, are linked to the 
logical argument position occupied by it. I have challenged these accounts and showed that if 
one applies the tests suggested by Postal and Pullum (1988) and Seppänen (2002), irrealis it 
behaves like a dummy it, and that irrealis clauses are simply extraposed subjects or internal 
complements. What is more, I have shown that extraposition is not always mandatory, and 
that some predicates already take irrealis clauses as complements without a dummy it.  
 
The evidence and arguments I have presented in this dissertation open up a wide range of 
questions and directions for future research. As I briefly discussed in Ch. 2 §3, when and how 
are also strong candidates for the subordinator label, and more detailed analysis of their 
behaviour and status is undoubtedly warranted. Similarly, the close semantic relationship 
between irrealis if-clauses and for-to-clauses is also worth investigating in more detail.  
 
Most importantly, the data I have presented in this dissertation points towards an ongoing 
diachronic process of gradual clause integration (cf. Lehmann 1988, Givón 2001, and Hopper 
and Traugott 1993). Irrealis clauses probably started from the loosely attached adjunct 
position, moved on to a more integrated one as extraposed complements, and are currently 
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becoming even more attached as non-extraposed complements, as suggested by the fact that 
more and more predicates allow such close integration, especially in colloquial speech. As 
Hopper and Traugott point out (1993: 168) the diachronic process of clause combining has 
only recently begun to attract in depth study. Irrealis clauses constitute a great opportunity to 
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